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The subject of Portugal and the Atlantic Pact has been approached both 
from the diplomatic and political, the strategic and military point of view, 
whenever die international situation or Portuguese foreign policy have 
brought the question to light.
The same cannot be said about the historical approach to the problem, 
especially with regard to the birth and the first steps of the Atlantic 
Alliance.
For a long time now, French, English and North American 
historiographies1 have been studying the subject with regard to both its 
general aspects and also more specifically, to different national cases. And 
today, countries other than great powers which played a major role in 
forging the pact are being studied -  i.e. Italy and the Scandinavian 
countries 2. The situation of such countries is similar to that of Portugal,
1 Cf. historiographic production up to the eighties, Colin Gordon, The Atlantic 
Alliance : a bibliography, London/New York, 1978. The recent historiography 
(79 and the eighties) will be referred along the work.
2 On Italy the production is numerous. Cf. in chronological order: Mario Toscano, 
“Appunti sui negoziati per la participazione dell’ Italia al Patto Atlantico”, in, Storia 
e Politica, VI, 1962, n2 1, p.p.1/37 and n2 2, p.p.196/231, republished in Mario 
Toscano, Pagine di Storia Diplomatica Contemporanea, Voi. Il, Origine 
e Vicende della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Milano, 1973; G. Di Capua, 
Come l’Italia aderì al Patto Atlantico Roma, 1971; P. Pastorelli, “L’ 
Adesione dell’ Italia al Patto Atlantico”, in Storia Contemporanea, XIV, 1983, 
n2 6, p.p.1015/1030, republished in, G. Rossini (a cura di ) De Gasperi e P età 
del Centrismo, Rma, 1984, p.p. 75/94; H. Timothy Smith, “The Fear of 
Subversion: The United States and inclusion of Italy in Nothem Atlantic Treaty”, in 
Diplomatic History, VII, 1983, n2 2, p.p.139/155; Antonio Varsori, “La scelta 
Occidentale dell’ Italia” (1948-1949), in Storia dele Relazioni Internazionali, 
Anno I, 1985, n2 1, p.p.95/159 and n2 2,p.p.303/368; Paolo Emilio Taviani, 
“Come 1’ Italia entrò nell Patto Atlantico: mitologia e storia”, in La Scelta 
Atlantica, Roma, s/d; and very recently Antonio Lamberti, “L’ Adesione Italiana al 
Patto Atlantico”, in Luigi Corsi/Antonio Lamberti, Il Trauma della Nato, 
Firenze, 1 989, p.p.29/41.
On the Scandinavian countries case Cf. Sven Hennings, “Searching for the 
Security in the North-Denmark’s road to Nato” e Grehe Vaernp “Fate of the North 
Option -  the absence of guarantees for a Scandinavian defense association turns 
Norway firmly towards the Atlantic Alliance”, in André De Staercke, Nato’s 
Anxious Birth, New York, 1985, p.p 42/52 and 87/94. Recently a 
reinterpretation of the problem in Annie Lacroix Riz, “L’ Entrée de la Scandinavie 
dans le Pacte Atlantique (1943-1949)”, in Guerres Mondiales et Conflits 
Contemporaines, n2 149, Jan. 1988, p.p.52/92; and more recntly, Poul 
Villaume, “Neither Appeasement nor Servility: Denmark and the Atlantic Alliance, 




























































































although, the Portuguese case has not yet been dealt with in any great 
detail.
The main scope of this work is, then, to study the position of Portugal 
in the international situation that leads to the foundation of the Atlantic 
Pact, and Portugal’s role as a founder member within this.
In general and regardless of the political position of the various 
authors, the historiographical approaches to the Portuguese case have 
been influenced by two types of constraints, one of a practical and the 
other of a theoretical nature. The former is connected with the difficulty 
in consulting the documentation, still not available to the general public 
today. The latter is related to two assumptions that have markedly 
influenced the results. First, the tendency to stress the role of the 
statesman regardless of the “deep forces”, to use Renouvin and 
Duroselle’s concept3. Second, the fact that Portugal has been considered, 
if not isolated in the international scene, at least completely autonomous 
regarding its positions on foreign policy. That is, the historiographies 
concentrate exclusively on the political and diplomatic positions of 
Salazar, neglecting both the internal and external factors. They tend to 
forget that Portugal is a small power, strongly influenced by its own geo­
political position and subject to the changing external pressures imposed 
on it by the international scene. In this work, although the role of the 
statesman is not denied, an attempt is made to place it within its limits: 
these being, at an external level, the international scene and the 
importance of the geo-strategical and geo-political position of Portuguese 
territory. At an internal level, these factors include the position of the 
armed forces and the various political forces, in both the Regime and the 
opposition regarding Portugal’s joining the Pact.
The documents used in this work include four fundamental sources: the 
diplomatic documents exchanged during negotiations, belonging today to 
the Archives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (not for public 
consultation); official documents published in the “Diarios do Govemo” 
and in the minutes of the sessions of the “Assembleia Nacional” and the 
“Camara Corporativa”; the contemporary press reports; the memoirs, 
diaries and other records left by the military, diplomats and politicians 
involved in the negotiations.
Three main issues to be developed will be:
1 -  A short review of the national historiographic production, 
reviewing the present stand-point of the problem.
3 Cf. Pierre Renouvin/Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction à I’ Histoire des 




























































































2 -  the external conditions -  the international background and the 
situation that leads to the foundation of the Pact and its effects on 
Portugal.
3 -  the Portuguese response to international developments, that is, the 
difficult and long process of decision-making that leads Portugal to join 
the Pact, influencing both its foreign policy and the future of the regime.
2 . Portuguese Historiography:
The first work on the subject is by Henrique Martins de Carvalho in his 
book “Portugal e o Pacto do Atlàntico”4 Published in 1953, shortly after 
the historic Lisbon meeting of the Atlantic Council (February 1952). In 
spite of the fact that it is so close to the event, this text is still today the 
most exhaustive and thorough study available and is also the only one that 
does not share the assumptions referred to previously entirely. The author 
interprets not only the international scene but also the Portuguese position 
from a geo-strategical and geo-political approach. To Martins de 
Carvalho it is not only the Russian threat that forces the birth of the 
Atlantic Alliance as a solution to the defense problem of the Western 
World. It is however, the geo-strategic position of Portuguese territory 
and the Cold War which explain the invitation to Lisbon to join the Pact 
and, in fact, Portugal’s participation in this Western defense plan. It 
should be added that, this complex situation obliges Portugal to join the 
Alliance instead of making a mere bilateral agreement with the U.S.A. 
and the United Kingdom.
Recently, various works have been published, some stuyding the 
problem partially, others in a summary form. They all differ in their 
theoretical approaches as well as in their political standpoints.
Albano Nogueira has published an article in the Revue de l ’OTAN on 
the subject “La naissance de TAlliance, une perspective Portugaise”5. 
Based on an exclusively diplomatic approach, the work is centred on 
Portuguese foreign policy, and particularly on Salazar’s political views
4 Henrique Martins de Carvalho, Portugal e o Pacto do Atlàntico, Lisboa, 
1953.
^ Albano Nogueira, “La naissance de l'Alliance, une perspective Portugaise”, 
Revue de I'Otan, Oct. 1980, p. 8/13. Republished under the title" The Pull of the 
Continent -  Portugal votes for a European as well as an Atlantic Role”, in De 




























































































and diplomacy concerning the foundation of the Alliance and the inclusion 
of Portugal. In spite of the reservations put forward, of the internal 
contradictions and of the unenthusiastic climate during negotiations, 
Portugal finally joined the alliance. After summarizing the diplomatic 
process, Albano Nogueira attempts an interpretation of Salazar’s position. 
According to him, Portuguese membership, was more than a political 
position, a moral duty. It was an ethical obligation, a “crusade” against 
communism in defense of Western Christian Civilization.
José Medeiros Ferreira has also dedicated an article to the problem, 
entitled “As Ditaduras Ibéricas e a Fundaçâo da Aliança Atlàntica”6- later 
republished in Um século de Problemas -  as relaçôes luso-espanholas da 
Uniào Ibèrica à Comunidade Europeia. And he has recently come back to 
the subject in an introductory note to the debate on the ratification of the 
Pact in 19497. Medeiros Ferreira's text is based upon an analysis of the 
foreign policy and tries to evaluate the roles of both Salazar and the 
Portuguese diplomacy in the process that leading up to the signing of the 
pact. Bearing the global context, constantly in mind, he focuses on the 
Portugal-Spain relationship, that is, the effects of Portugal’s joining 
NATO on the Iberian Pact. He also considers the strategic consequences 
of the isolation of Spain. According to him, the role played by Salazar 
and Portuguese diplomacy in the formation of the alliance was nil. The 
same can not be said for the role they played in the diplomatic relations 
between Spain and Portugal: here Salazar obtained a diplomatic victory 
against the trend. He had aimed at the inclusion of Spain in the Atlantic 
Pact but it was her exclusion that, in fact, benefited Portuguese foreign 
policy, with important consequences in the Iberian context. From then 
onwards Portugal would be the privileged link between Spain and the 
West, a situation that benefited Portugal by increasing her power of 
negotiation.
In spite of these analyses and a short summarising article8 which is 
developed in this text, the main issue about the Portuguese participation in 
the foundation and in the first steps of the Alliance, is still derived from
6 José Medeiros Ferreira, As Ditaduras Ibéricas e a Fundaçâo da Aliança Atlàntica, 
in O Estado Novo -  das origens ao fini da autarcia, Lisboa, 1987, vol. I, 
pp. 395/401 and Um século de Problemas -  as relaçôes luso-espanholes 
da Uniào Iberica à Comunidade Europeia, Lisboa, 1989, p. 57/66.
7 José Medeiros Ferreira, “A ratificaçâo portuguesa do Tratado do Atlàntico”, in 
Politica Internacional, n2 1 ,  1990, p.p.155/157.
8 Nuno Severiano Teixeira -  “Portugal na O.T.A.N.” in Dicionârio Ilustrado 




























































































its contemporary echoes. Carried by the official institutions9 and by the 
Régime's press,10 this concept is still supported by Franco Nogueira 
today.
Franco Nogueira develops his views on the subject in some of his 
works. First in his biography of Salazar11 and then in the second 
supplement to the “Historia de Portugal” by Damiâo Peres12. His work is 
important on account of the documental sources used, as the author 
consulted material from Salazar’s archives which are not accessible to the 
other researchers. Not only is Nogueira’s work based on the assumptions 
previously discussed -  neglecting the influence of internal and external 
factors and giving emphasis to Salazar’s role in the process, but it is also 
largely based on the implicit scope of legitimating the political and 
diplomatic behaviour of the Présidente do Conselho. In short, one could 
say that, on the subject of the constitution of the Alliance and Portugal’s 
participation, Franco Nogueira supports two main issues: first, he stresses 
Portugal’s role as a founder member; second, he even attributes the 
paternity of the idea of an Atlantic Pact to Salazar himself13 .
The following presentation of new information on the problem, will 
enable a further review of these theses, according to the theoretical 
standpoints developed previously.
9 Cf. Diario das Sessôes da Assembleia Nacional and the Report of the Câmara 
Corporativa, particularly Diario das Sessôes da Assembleia Nacional, n2 
200 e 201, on the 26 and 28 of July, 1949.
10 Cf. particularly Diàrio da Manhâ.
11 Franco Nogueira, Salazar, volIV, Coimbra, 1980.
12 in Damiâo Peres, História de Portugal, II Suplemento, Lisboa, 1986.




























































































3. The international scene and the 
origins of the Atlantic Pact:
The fact that the Atlantic Pact has a civilizational identity with old and 
deep roots is not doubted and Claude Delmas has demonstrated it very 
clearly14-
That “Atlantism”, in the sense we give it, from 1945 to the present day, 
begins to form in the first post-war period, is the conclusion that can be 
drawn from Denise Artaud's work on the historical origins of 
“Atlantism”15.
Nevertheless, the direct origins of the Atlantic Pact must be sought 
during Second World War, and more essentially in the evolution of the 
international scene in the following post-war period.
Already during the War, the first ideas for he reorganisation the 
international scene according to new principles appear, and the bases of 
what would later became a new collective security system are laid. The 
first demonstration of this new spirit was the so-called “Atlantic Charter” 
signed on the 26th August 1941 on board the “Prince of Wales”, by 
Churchill and Roosevelt. Following the “Atlantic Charter” and its spirit, 
and with the Soviet Union already at war, the “United Nations 
Declaration” is signed in Washington on the 1st January 1942 . During 
1943 diplomatic efforts were made in order to further these measures. 
First, in October, at the Moscow Conference, and then in November, at 
the Tehran Conference attended by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, 
during which the Soviet Union affirmed her formal adhesion to the 
Declaration. Finally, on the 26th June 1945, during the San Francisco 
Conference, the “United Nations Charter” is formally approved, thus 
marking the first appearance of O.N.U.
14 Claude Delmas, Les Enracinements Historiques de 1’ Atlantisme, 
Paris, 1979.
15 Cf. Denise Artaud, “Aux Origines de 1’ Atlantisme : à la Recherche d’ un 
équilibre européen au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale”, in Relations 




























































































A new world was being bom from the mins of war. Yalta and Potsdam 
would forge the bases of a new international system -  heterogeneous and 
bipolar, to use Raymond Aron’s classification16-
At Yalta, the agreement between the “Great Powers” was made with de­
nazification in mind. Yet, between Yalta and Potsdam, the concept of 
“democratization” opened the controversy between Anglo-Saxons and 
Soviets. From the start the “Declaration of Free Europe”, that planned 
free elections and the establishment of democratic regimes in the 
countries in question, caused a political and ideological rift between the 
two opposing concepts of Democracy: parliamentary democracy, in the 
West; popular democracy, in the East. In May 1945, Churchill already 
spoke of the “Iron Curtain”17.
In spite of the efforts of the diplomatic marathon that ended with the 
New York Conference, international tension gets progressively worse 
during all of 1946: first, the Azerbaijan problem; afterwards the outbreak 
of Civil War in Greece; and finally the first blocks in the mechanism of 
the foursided institutions in Germany. The confrontation between the 
Soviets and the Western Allies was now open and declared.
On top of the political and ideological rift-parliamentary democracy/ 
popular democracy -  a second rift of an economic nature appeared: that 
of capitalism/socialism. A third division, of a military and political nature 
was, than, to appear -  the formation of the Alliances N.A.T.O./ Warsaw 
Pact.
Nevertheless, to understand the birth of the political and military 
alliances one needs to focus closely on a problem that became one of the 
main concerns after the Second World War -  the problem of European 
security.
The great threat to European security, which had been constituted by 
Nazi Germany since the Thirties, was at the forefront of the minds of the 
political leaders and international public opinion immediately after the 
War. And it was as a result of the German threat that the first attempt at 
European security was made -  the Treaty of Dunkirk, signed between 
France and Great Britain, on the 4th March 1947.
16 Raymond Aron, Paix et G uerre  entre les Nations, Paris, 1963, p.p. 
108/113 and 144/148.
17 Telegram from Churchill to Truman, on the 12 May 1945, quoted in, Claude 




























































































Very soon, however, the development of the Cold War would change 
the features of the international situation.
When the Cold War was at its peak in 1948, the problem of founding a 
defense organization by the Western European countries could not leave 
the United States indifferent.
The Vandenberg resolution, approved by the Senate on the 11th June 
1948, would bring an end to the traditional isolation of the United States. 
From then onwards, the United States, following constitutional 
procedures, would support “regional or collective measures, based upon a 
individual or mutual, effective and continuous help”18. The possibility of 
a mutual defense system including to the whole area of the North Atlantic 
was created.
In this bipolar world and included in the Western bloc, the situation 
changed for Western Europe -  the threat was no longer German but 
Soviet, and the security framework was not European, but Atlantic.
In this context, and following previous contacts, the United States and 
Canada opened negotiations with the governments which had signed the 
Bmssels Pact, in order to sign the Atlantic North Pact. Started on the 6th 
July 1948 in Washington, the negotiations were successfully completed in 
September of the same year19. After a short period of diplomatic 
consultations, on the 15th March 1949 these countries formally invited six 
other countries belonging to the area of application of the Treaty to join 
them in signing the Pact, scheduled for April 1949. Portugal was included 
in those powers.
18 Vandenberg Resolution -  Resolution 239 of North-American Senate, 809 
Congress, 2s Session, on the 11 Jily 1948, in O .T .A .N .- Documents 
Fondamentaux, Bruxelles, 1976, p. 11. Cf. Senator Vandenberg’s report on the 
resolution in, Vandebbreg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 
Wesport/Connecticut, 1952, p.p.392/420.
19 The international situation whcich led to the signing of the Pact, particularly the 
different phases of the negotiatios leading to its conclusion, have been minutely 
studied by historiographers after 78. Cf. paticularly: Pierre Mélandri, L’Alliance 
Atlantique, Paris, 1979, p.p. 9/62; Thimoty P. Ireland, Creating the 
EntanglingAlliance -The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, Wesport /London, 1981, p.p.9/151; Sir Nicholas Henderson, The 
Birth of Nato, London, 1982; Don Cook, Forging the Alliance, Nato 1945 




























































































4. Portugal and the foundation of the Atlantic 
Pact:
The first question to be dealt with is relatively simple -  why was 
Portugal invited to take part in the Pact? The main reason is 
fundamentally of a geo-strategic nature and can be found in the 
framework of the new security system developed by the Brussels Pact 
countries, U.S.A. and Canada. Conceived against the Soviet threat, this 
security system for the North Atlantic was based, as it still is today, on 
two basic pillars. The first, the American continent, acting as the 
rearguard, a sort of a second line based on the extraordinary strategic 
potential of the United States, which was essential as the U.S.A. provided 
indispensable back-up and guarantied the whole system . The second was 
Western Europe, whose countries would form the front line and provide 
immediate defense. Nevertheless, the area of the application of the treaty 
was not yet complete. Firstly their flanks had to be protected. This 
explains the invitation to join, which was extended to Norway and 
Denmark in Northern Europe, and to Italy in Southern Europe20. General 
Franco’s Spain, under international blockade after the end of the Second 
World War, would not be invited. Secondly, and to guarantee the 
functioning of the system, it was indispensable to promote the linkage 
between the front and the rear, that is, between the two pillars of the Pact. 
Thus Iceland was invited in the extreme North and Portugal was invited 
in the extreme south of the North Atlantic, the
Azores playing a decisive role on account of their strategic value21.
In fact, the Azores, a vital strategic point in the Atlantic, were the main 
reason for this invitation. An important military base in the First World 
War, their the
importance had been fundamental in the Second World War and they 
were indispensable in the post-war period 22. Their geo-strategic value led
20 Cf note ne 1
21 On the Strategic value of Portuguese territories, particularly the Atlantic Islands, 
Cf. Virgilio de Carvalho: Cumprir Agora Portugal, Lisboa,1987, p. 79/91 and 
“A Importância Estratégica das Regiôes Autónomas” in. Naçâo e Defesa ns 13, 
jan/mar 1980, p . l l l .
22 On the historic importance of the Azores Bases Cf. José Medeiros Ferreira, “Os 
Açores nas duas guerras mundiais”, in Politica Internacional, na 1, Jan. 1990, 
p.p.5/17; and Gianluca André, Il Problema delle Azzore e la Neutralità del 




























































































the Pentagon to include it in their defense plans, and to show interest in 
including them in their system of bases of the post-war period. After 
tough negotiations, on the 2nd February 1948, Portugal and the United 
States sign an agreement on the Azores23 • Now part of the Atlantic Pact, 
the importance of the Azores was confirmed and reinforced: in case of an 
attack coming from the east, the main concept of defense developed by the 
Alliance was the “rapid reinforcement of Europe”. This reinforcement 
passed inevitably through the Azores: the Azorean bases were in a 
fundamental strategic position to cater to Europe's economic and military 
needs. Furthermore, the military bases could serve as a control station of 
sea and air routes ways in the North Atlantic.
The second question concerns the role played by Portugal and Portuguese 
diplomacy in the foundation of the Pact, and the consequencies of the 
adhesion to Portuguese domestic and foreign policy. And this is much 
more difficult. We will try to answer it by analysing and understanding it 
in the long, complex process from the invitation to the ratification of the 
Treaty. At the end of the preliminary negotiations between the European 
and American partners and after they had agreed on the general basis of 
the treaty, Portugal was informed of the course of the negotiations. On 
the 6th October 1948, the British Embassy delivered in Lisbon a “Pro­
memòria”, informing the Portuguese government of the recent 
negotiations and stated the need to form a security system which should be 
in agreement with the United Nations Charter, in particular with its 
Clauses number 51 and 52 24.
A few months later, on the 31st December and following exhaustive 
enquiries from the London and Washington Embassies, Portugal gave her 
answer.
In its document, the Portuguese government considered that the 
international scene required, in fact, “the existence of a diplomatic 
instrument, of a defensive character, allowing the coordinating of the 
efforts of the different North Atlantic countries in case of aggression”, 
but it also made three points it thought important. In the first place, any 
attempt at exceeding national autonomy or integration was rejected and 
“projects of economic or politic fusion, of union or federation” were 
considered unacceptable. Secondly, “Portugal expressed the fear that the
23 On the Azores Bases Agreements Cf. R. E. Vintras Histôria Secreta da 
Base dos Açores, Lisboa, 1975; and more recently Antonio Marquina Barrio, La 
Espana en la Politica de Seguridad Ocidental, Madrid, 1986, particulary 
the first Apendix, p.p. 943/960.
24 British Pro-memoria on the 6 October 1948 -  A.M.N.E., Negocios 




























































































main aim of the treaty was to establish in peacetime military bases of 
strategic value for the defense of the Atlantic”. Obviously this remark was 
meant to clear up the Azorean situation. Lastly, attention was drawn to 
the Spanish situation. The geographical and strategic unity of the Iberian 
Peninsula was reaffirmed, and Spain was held as an important country for 
Western defense, together with Portugal25- This position corresponded to 
the official standing supported by the war minister Santos Costa.
From then onwards, insistent reports from the London and Washington 
Embassies arrived in Lisbon, reaffirming the interest felt by the countries 
already involved for Portugal’s inclusion in the treaty 26.
By that time, negotiations between the European and American allies 
were concluded and a provisional version of the treaty was ready, and 
there was a decision was made to invite six other countries. The U.S.A. 
and the United Kingdom were nominated official negotiators with 
Portugal, and opened the first informal contacts in order to prepare 
further negotiations and a possible invitation to join the Pact27
The long and complex process of negotiations developed all through 
1949, in two main phases. The first consisted of the inicial and informal 
contacts up to the signing of the treaty, on the 4th April; the second, 
lasted from the signing of the treaty to its ratification on the 25th July.
The first period began on the 10th January, when Lisbon received the 
answers from the United States and the United Kingdom to the Portuguese 
government . The positions of the negotiating powers were basically in 
agreement on political and diplomatic issues. Both negotiators confirmed 
and reassented their interest in Portugal's participation and tried to 
clarify some of the points requested by the Lisbon government.
With regard to the United Nations Charter, the document explained 
that, although it was mentioned in the treaty, its text would allow the 
signing of the treaty by the countries who did not belong to the United 
Nations.
As to the three basic points previously made by Lisbon, it was stated in 
the document that, in relation to the first, the treaty did not allow for the
25 Portuguse Pro-memoria, on the 31 December 1948, A.M .N.E., 
Negôcios Politicos, Arm. 50, Maço37.
26 Telegrams ns 11 from the Embassy of London onthe 7 January, 
1949; and n2 10 from the Embassy of Washington on the 11 January 
1949 -  A.M.N.E., Negôcios Politicos, Arm.50, Maço 37.
27 British Aid-Memoire on the 10 January, 1949 -  A.M.N.E., Negôcios 




























































































establishment of military bases for the defense of the North Atlantic in 
peacetime. Furthermore, the North American document said that use of 
the military bases in each territory would only be made within the 
framework of the consultation mechanism allowed by the Pact. Thus, the 
concession of any military facilities could never made without the consent 
of the sovereign country -  the guarantees on the Azorean territory 
seemed to have been given.
Regarding the second point, they said that the Pact did not aim at any 
attempt at integration or supranationality, that “the members of the treaty 
would not not give up total autonomy of the parts”. The American 
document even guarantees that, although the United States was glad to be 
able to count on the integration of the Western European nations, the Pact 
was a completely different plan that should not be confused with those 
measures. So, there was no incompatibility between the Pact and the 
positions expressed by the Portuguese government.
Finally, in relation to Spain, both the countries recognized the 
Portuguese argument on the strategic unity of the Iberian Peninsula as a 
whole and the value of Spanish territory. Nevertheless both restated the 
impossibility of Spain’s joining in the present situation on account of its 
internal situation. However, the American document suggested that, if 
Portugal joined, future negotiations for the integration of Spain would be 
easier 28-
When delivering diplomatic documents, the American ambassador in 
Lisbon, MacVeagh, expressed to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Caeiro da Matta, the wish to be informed on, how and when, the 
formal invitation to join the Pact could be presented29-
Between the last days of February and the first days of March, news on 
the conclusion of the final version of the treaty, accompanied by the first 
pressure on Lisbon to make clear her position on the matter, arrived in 
Lisbon from several Portuguese Embassies in different countries. The 
North American Department of State foresaw the publication of the treaty 
for a near date (scheduled for the 15th, it took place on the 18th). At the 
moment of the publication of the treaty, the United States wanted to
28 North American Aid-Memoire on the 10 January 1949, A.M.N.E., 
Negocios Politicos, Arm. 50, Maijo 37.
29 Portuguese Memorial on the 8 March 1949 -  A. M.N.E., Negocios 




























































































announce its adherents30. Theotonio Pereira insisted from Washington 
that Portugal should make a decision.
In spite of this insistence, the Portuguese Government did not express 
its decision. The delay was related not only to the mentioned previously 
remarks, but also with the first Spanish pressure on Lisbon, invoking the 
Iberian Pact and its Additional Protocol.
In the first days of March, in order to ensure its position and, maybe, to 
gain some time and enhance its negotiating position, the Portuguese 
government sent the negotiating countries a memorandum. Caeiro da 
Matta expressed once more the Portuguese points and clearly defined the 
wishes and the guarantees required by Portugal.
There were basically three issues to be cleared, without which a 
definitive final decision could not be taken:
-  first, the duration of the treaty. Twenty years, the period propagated 
by the international press, seemed too long to the Portuguese 
Government. After having obtained Portuguese neutrality in the Second 
War, Salazar did not want to get involved in any other conflict, that might 
break out in such a long period;
-  second, and once more, the Spanish question. Not only was the theory 
of Santos Costa on the strategic unity of the Iberian Peninsula and 
consequently the importance of Spain in any defense plan of the West and 
the Atlantic restated, but a a strong argument was put forward as to the 
internal situation invoked by the negotiating countries. He stated that if 
the “ present position of the Spanish government is, fortunately, not a 
military or strategic problem to the countries present at the Washington 
negotiations, the Portuguese government feels obliged to draw the 
attention of the other nations to the probability of an evolution of Spanish 
politics towards an extremist government with predictable political and 
strategic consequences”.
-  in third place, there was an attempt to clear up the situation of the 
Portuguese colonies regarding the Atlantic Pact, trying to include them in 
the treaty's security area.
-  finally, and once more, the Charter of the United Nations was quoted. 
Its mention in the treaty was considered unkind to Portugal, which was 
not a member of the organization31.
30 Telegram n2 73 from the Embassy of Washington, on the 8 March 
1949, A.M.N.E. Arquivo da Em baixada de Washington, Pasta 150 proc. 70.




























































































From this moment onwards, a tough and complex process of decision­
making took place. The Portuguese government, besides its involvement 
in its internal contradictions, was the target of crossfire coming from 
outside. On one hand, the negotiating countries, Britain and the United 
States, who urged Portugal to join the Pact, and on the other Spain, who 
tried to persuade Portugal not to do so.
On the 17th March the formal invitation to join the Pact was received in 
Portugal together with the final text of the treaty. These were 
accompanied by two diplomatic documents, giving the explanations 
required and justifying the motives of the negotiating countries. In both 
of them there was a total rejection of the Portuguese proposals, although 
this was justified in a diplomatic manner.
In the first place, the suggestion to reduce the period of duration of the 
treaty is rejected, given that Clauses 12 and 13 of the Pact did not lead to 
the “apprehensions on that respect expressed by the Portuguese 
Government”.
Secondly, they definitely rejection the inclusion of Spain for the reasons 
expressed in previous documents.
Thirdly, and according to the clause 5 of the Pact, they said that the 
Portuguese colonies could not be included in the area protected by the 
treaty. They added that other countries such as France and England were 
in the same situation32
On the other hand, Spain began to put on pressure in the opposite 
direction. In fact, as soon as the formal invitation to Portugal to join the 
Pact was made public , Nicolas Fmaco, Spanish ambassador in Lisbon 
asked Caeiro da Matta for an immediate audience33.
In a long memorandum, Franco, invoking the Iberian Pact, manifested 
his total disagreement regarding the possibility of Portugal signing the 
Treaty. This disapproval was based on two points:
-  first, Portugal had reached an advanced stage in the negotiations with 
the western countries after assuming a unilateral position, without 
consulting Spain in the scope of the Iberian Pact.
32 British Pro-memoria on the 17 March -  A.M.N.E., Negócios Politicos, 
Arm. 50, Mago 37.
33 Letter of Nicolas Franco, from the Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, on 




























































































-  Second, he stated that article 8 of the Atlantic treaty was not 
compatible with any previous diplomatic commitment and thus with the 
Iberian Pact. In conclusion Spain meant that Portugal “should have 
previously studied the invitation and made a decision either with the 
previous agreement with Spain, or if they had not both examined the new 
situation created by the treaty, agreed on common action by both of each 
one”34-
This position, which Spain presented formally to the Portuguese 
government35, was not meant to obtain Portugal’s exclusion from the 
treaty, but rather to achieve Spain's inclusion together with Portugal.
The situation was getting more complex every day and a definitive 
answer was becoming more and more urgent.
Theotonio Pereira sent reliable information from Washington: the 
Portuguese wishes could not be accepted. The first and the second, 
because they would alter the text of the treaty. As it had already been 
published that would be completely impossible. The third demand was 
rejected because, after consultation with the countries involved in the 
treaty, all of them, without exception, were in favour of keeping the 
duration of the treaty at twenty years36.
A decision had to be made urgently and Salazar called a meeting of the 
ministers. In the days before the meeting took place, the Prime Minister 
received a letter from the Secretary of State Dean Acheson and a personal 
appeal from the Prime Minister Bevin, through their embassies
They both insisted that Salazar should sign the Pact in equal 
circumstances with the other signatories, but they both definitively 
refused the Portugal’s requests. They suggested, in a veiled form, that, if 
Portugal refused the invitation, such a refusal could be exploited by the 
Soviet Union: international public opinion would feel that Lisbon held a 
serious responsibility if this happened.
Bevin asked Palmela, the Portuguese ambassador in London, “to insist 
personally with Salazar to sign the Pact”. Considering the two first 
Portuguese wishes solved, he stated that the only person responsible for
34 Spanish Memorandum on the 21 March 1949, A.M.N.E., Negócios 
Politicos, Arm. 50, Maço 37.
35 Letter of Nicolas Franco from Spanish Embassy in Lisbon, on the 
24 March 1949, A.M.N.E., Negócios Politicos, Arm. 50, Maço 37.
36 Telegram ns 97 from the Embassy of Washington, on the 20 March 




























































































the duration of twenty years was himself. Answering Salazar's 
reservations about a possible involvement in a European conflict, he 
explained that “the only danger that can exist in the next twenty years is 
the Russian one”37.
Dean Acheson confirmed in his letter the impossibility of reducing the 
duration of the Pact. Such a radical change in American external policy, 
like the Vanderberg Resolution, would not be justified by a shorter 
duration. Furthermore, such a period “could prove inadequate to ensure 
the necessary stability [...] and security to Europe...”38. He added, a 
Portuguese refusal could stimulate other countries’ refusals which the 
Soviet Union might exploit, thus endangering Western security.
Although the requests for the strategical military bases were granted, 
none of the other Portuguese demands were accepted. In fact, none of 
them seriously affected the great powers.
The external pressures on Lisbon grew greater and greater. Her old 
ally and the new maritime power insisted, on one hand, that Portugal 
should join the Pact. Spain, on the other, tried to get Portugal to refuse 
membership in order to negotiate her own inclusion together. As this 
possibility was out of question, not to sign could seem a clear concession 
to Madrid's pressure. On the other hand, adhesion meant to Portugal the 
pursuit of the traditional Atlantic vocation of its foreign policy.
Finally, the progressive bipolarization of the international situation and 
the worsening of the Cold War brought any further hesitation to an end. 
If Portugal refused, it would be an obvious sign of the fragmentation of 
the West, susceptible to exploitation by the Soviet Union. This was too 
expensive a risk for Portugal to take, and it was the last thing Salazar 
really wanted.
The decision could no longer wait, and, after three agitated meetings of 
the Government, a decision was made: Portugal would sign the Pact.
On the 30th March Portugal sent her formal acceptance of the invitation 
to the negotiating countries, and announced that she would be represented 
by her Foreign Affairs Minister at the ceremony of the signing of the 
treaty39
37 Telegrams ns 78/ 79/ 80 from the Embassy of London, on the 19 
March 1949, A.M.N.E., Negócios Politicos, Arm. 50, ma90 37.
38 Letter from Dean Acheson, on the 22 March 1949, A.M .N.E., 
Negócios Politicos, Arm.50, Ma?o 37.
39 Letter from the Portuguese Governement to the British and North- 
American Embassies on the 30 March 1949, A.M .N.E., Negócios 




























































































Caeiro da Matta was in Washington on the 4th April and, together with 
the other founding members and under Truman's chairmanship, signed 
the North Atlantic Treaty.
This position of the Portuguese government gave origin to different and 
contradictory reactions. Its consequences were various and meaningful, in 
both the external and internal contexts. A second phase of the process had 
begun by then, leading to the ratification of the treaty.
As regards the external context, the Alliance imposed a redifinition of 
the traditional Atlantic vector of the Portuguese foreign policy, now in a 
multilateral context and under the influence of a new maritime power: the 
United States of America. On the continent, the normalization of the 
relations with Spain was a necessity, as these had been affected by the 
Portuguese adhesion to the Pact. First, in order to calm Spanish 
susceptibilities, Salazar gave an interview to the United Press, and this 
was quoted widely in the newspapers there. Afterwards, the Portuguese 
government sent a formal justification of its position to Madrid. Portugal 
had always supported the strategic unity of the Iberian Peninsula and the 
importance of the Spanish territory to western security, and had fought 
until the end for the inclusion of Spain in the treaty. Such a request had 
not been accepted by the negotiating countries. Because of this and in such 
a situation, the adhesion of Portugal would be advantageous not only to 
Portugal but also to Spain, as she could count on a friendly voice inside 
the organization, that might be able to negotiate the inclusion of Spain 
later on. In the same document the Portuguese government rejected the 
Spanish statement that Portugal’s adhesion would mean growing risks and 
threats to Spain. Finally, he declared that there was no formal 
incompatibility between the Atlantic and the Iberian Pacts40-
The Spanish answer was moderate and conciliatory. Nevertheless, it 
considered the need to define, if not revise, the concept of “assistance” 
included in the Iberian Pact and its Additional Protocol, in order to 
construct a new state of relations between the two Iberian States. All this, 
wanting the “continuation of cooperation regarding the foreign policy of 
our two countries towards a cordial and firm friendship, that has ruled 
our relationships”41-
411 Portuguese Memorandum to the Spanish Government, on the 28 
March 1949, A.M.N.E., Negócios Politicos, Arm. 50, Mago 37.
41 Letter from the Spanish ambassador, Nicolas Franco, to the 
Portuguese Governement on the 8 April 1949, A. M.N.E., Negócios 




























































































The process of normalization of Portuguese-Spanish relations was 
under way. The signing of a Preliminary Agreement of Economic 
Cooperation42, in July 1949, would confirm it. The visit paid to Salazar in 
October by Franco crowned this normalization43.
At an internal level, Portugal’s integration in the Alliance divided the 
military and political opponents and the supporters of the regime 
completely, starting with government itself.
Even before the decision to join the Pact, the disagreement between 
members of the government was clear. Costa Leite, invoking economic 
arguments, was in favour of joining; Cavaleiro Ferreira, cautious, 
maintained that Portugal should wait, and not make any immediate 
decision right away. Caeiro da Matta and Américo Thomaz, were in favor 
of signing without hesitation. José Frederico Ulrich was against it. Lastly, 
Cancela de Abreu and Santos Costa, absent from the first two meetings of 
the Council, would give their agreement44 45.
Opinion was divided not only in the government, but also in the 
opposition. Triggered off by the presidential campaign of Norton de 
Matos, the increasingly apparent rift between its different factions became 
final with Portugal’s integration into the Pact. One side was the 
democratic opposition of the republican tradition, on the other the 
Communist party -  these positions already clearly defined by the Cold 
War 43 .
The democratic opposition was clearly in favour of the Atlantic Pact. 
The Alliance, comprising the main Western democracies and referring to 
the principles of the United Nations Charter, was viewed as an implicit 
condemnation of the authoritarian regime. Simultaneously it might be 
used as a possible form of pressure, even if weak , towards making the 
country democratic. The newspaper “Republica”, which expressed this 
sector’s opinion , gave full attention to the problems related to the
42 Luso-Spanish Preliminary Agreement of Economic Cooperation,
unpublished, A.M.N.E., Caixa dos Tratados Potugal-Espanha.
43 On the Spanish/Portuguese relations Cf., particulary from the Spanish point of 
view, Aldo Albònico, “Negoziati tra ‘Impotenze’: Spagna e Portogallo tra Patto 
Iberico e Alleanza Atlantica”, in Nuova Rivista Storica, Anno LXXIV, Maggio- 
Agosto 1990, Fascicolo IÜ-IV, pp. 333/348.
44 Cf. Franco Nogueira, op. cit. p.p. 143/144.
45 On Crisis of the Opposition to Salazar’s regime, Cf. D. L. Raby, Fascism and 





























































































building of the Alliance, from the beginning , considering it “a victory of 
the democracies”, as did Truman 46. In an editorial commenting on the 
signing and the meaning of the Pact, invoking the United Nations Charter, 
it was stated: “Absolutely against all authoritarian governments, [...] , all 
dictatorships, Whatever colour they are, we live today as yesterday with 
certainty and faith that with democratic institutions and thus enjoying all 
democratic liberties, all peoples, all men can achieve the peaceful and 
secure life they strive for. It is stated in the Atlantic Pact, and we 
understand it ourselves!”47-
On the other hand, the communists, agreeing with the Soviet positions, 
were radically against the Pact. The “Avante”, central organ of the 
Communist Party, although clandestine, expressed the opinion of this 
sector: “The Atlantic Pact was an instrument of aggression” of North 
American Imperialism. Its “purpose was clearly aggressive and was meant 
to prepare war against the U.S.S.R. and Popular Democracies, guardians 
of peace48. And Salazar, after “ruinous concessions of national wealth to 
Anglo-Saxon monopolies [...] after endangering national sovereignty by 
giving away aero-naval bases [...]” his policy of national betrayal 
culminated with the adhesion of Portugal to the Alliance. The Pact 
endangered Peace and National Independence”49-
The signing of the Treaty did not obtain complete consensus among the 
military also . Their opposition was not of a political nature but was 
essentially technical and military. Two different, if not opposite ways of 
interpreting the strategic military defense of Portugal and its integration 
into the post-war West’s security system were being debated: the model of 
General Santos Costa and the model of General Raul Esteves.
Santos Costa’s model, then Minister of War, was taken up and 
supported by the Portuguese government as its official position and this 
was the theory that prevailed in the diplomatic negotiations that led to the 
adhesion process. This theory was based on the concept of “Iberian Bloc”, 
that is, the defense, the geographical and geo-strategic unity of the Iberian 
Peninsula. Thus, the formation of a military defense system that was 
common to both Portugal and Spain was suggested. This idea, which had 
its historical origins in the support given by Salazar to Franco during the 
Civil War, also legitimated the Iberian Pact. Now the point was to update 
it in the context of the Cold War, allowing for the possibility of the
46 Cf. A Republica 19 March 1949, p.4.
47 Cf. A Republica, 25 Mach 1949, p.l.
48 Cf. Avante, second fortnigth of March 1949, p.2.




























































































arrival of the Soviet armies at the Pyrenees. “No geographical feature can 
serve as an obstacle to the normal development of military operations in 
the east-west sense through the whole Peninsula. In the light of this 
concept -  says Santos Costa -  the true power of the “Iberian Bloc” lies 
rather in the geographical reality -  which is undeniable- in its 
configuration and its obstacles in the interior, which channel rather than 
winder the movements of someone who, [...] having left the far interiors 
of the continent, wishes to profit from the heat of the sun or enjoy the 
sweet quietness of the always mystical and beautiful “western Portuguese 
coast”50-
It is precisely this concept of “Iberian Bloc” that is contested by Raul 
Esteve’s theory. Against this continental concept of a rear defense against 
any threat from the East, and against a Portuguese-Spanish “system” of 
military defense, he defended an Atlantic perspective, in which Portugal 
would be a forward defense of the United States and a total differentiation 
of the strategic functions of the Iberian territory. The line of the 
Pyrenees, he said, is no less vulnerable then any other defense line in 
Central Europe. And given the importance of the strategical potential of 
the United States to rescue Europe, military operations would have to be 
organized to the extreme west of the Atlantic coasts. “For these 
operational bases ... -  says Raul Esteves -  it is the Portuguese territory 
which geographically and historically is the most appropriate to be the 
main point to be considered. So, we should stress this point: the best base 
of operations for any fight in Europe, in the direction West -  East and 
coming from the Atlantic is undoubtedly Portugal and her Atlantic 
islands”. He underlined: “Portugal is for these cases the true base of 
operations and not the Iberian Peninsula”51-
In spite of these differing opinions on matters of strategy, the military 
supported, in general terms, Portugal’s integration in the Alliance. They 
expected that such membership would lead the way to the modernization 
and renewal of the Armed Forces52.
Some more radical sectors, however, did not consider the Pact to be a 
safe security system for Portugal . They reactly firmly against the myth
50 Santos Costa, on the preface to Alberto Andrade e Silva, Teatro de 
Operaçôes de Portugal, Lisboa, 1950, p. 9.
51 Raul Esteves, “O Pacto do Atlàntico e a Defesa de Portugal”, in O Comércio 
do Porto on 29 July 1949, republished in Revista Militar, n- 8/9, Aug/Sept. 
1949. Raul Esteves developed his thesis, later, in the book A Defesa Da Europa 
Ocidental, Lisboa, 1952.
52 Cf. the Report of the Defense Comission of the Assembleia Nacional in Diario 




























































































which, they said, had been created so that “the Americans will do it all”. 
Under the influence of a war psychosis, they thought war was possible 
and in this case neutrality was impossible. They called for a “national 
effort” for intensive military preparation53.
In opposition to these nationalist positions, Portugal’s inclusion in the 
Alliance’s military system brought many consequences and marked the 
beginning of a period of intense modernization for the Portuguese armed 
forces. This modernization included not only the renewal of technical 
equipment which the “Mutual Aid Plan” put into effect in the fifties, but 
also professional and specialized training of military staff54. This period 
of modernization and professional training of the armed forces caused 
and was therefore accompanied by a certain eclipse of military 
intervention in political life. As this had been a constant throughout 
Portuguese contemporary history, not only the Democratic Republic but 
also the New State, it is important to note that the last military coup of 
any consequence, before Nato, was the “Mealhada revolt” in 1946 and 
after that, only the “Abrilada” in 1961 with the beginning of the colonial 
problem55
In spite of all these hesitations and disagreements, the climate of public 
opinion was calm, as it should be in a regime where there was no place 
for political freedom.
On the 27th April the process of ratification of the Treaty began. As 
required by the Constitution, the text of the Treaty was sent to the 
“Assembleia Nacional” and next to the “Camara Corporativa”,56 which 
was supposed to analyse it. After long and agitated sessions, the “Camara 
Corporativa” drew up its conclusions on the ratification of the Treaty. In 
the first place, and according to the official position, great importance 
was given to the “remarkable foresight of the Treaty” by Salazar, “at a 
time when nobody had yet conceived it”. In the second , it emphasized 
once more, some of the reservations expressed by the government. 
Finally, and on account of the threat to Western and Christian
53 Cf. “N”, “Reflexôes sobre o Pacto AtlanticoI”, in Defesa Nacional, ne 185, 
Set. 1949, pp.70/71; and Nuno Vaz Pinto, “Reflexôes sobre o Pacto do 
AtlânticoII”, in Defesa Nacional n2 188, dez. 1949, p.p. 138/139.
54 Cf. Maria Carrilho,Forças Armadas e Mudança politica em Portugal 
no Séc. XX, Lisboa, 1985. On the technical aspect and the armament see 
particulary, p.p.332/335 and on the professional specialization of the staff, 
p.p.377/399.
55 Cf. Joâo B. Serra/Luis Salgado Matos, “Intervençôes militares na vida politica”, 
in Anâlise Social, n2 72/73/74, vol I, 1982, p.p. 1165/1195.




























































































Civilization, it could not help but give its agreement. “Truthfully, the 
Atlantic Pact will pass on to History as the symbol and the expression of a 
new crusade: that of the defense of the Western and Christian civilisation. 
That would be enough for us not to ignore it. As a Western and Catholic 
country by vocation, Portugal must welcome and ratify it with 
enthusiasm57.
So, following the ratification of the Treaty by other states and after 
Theotonio Pereira ensured that it was ratified by the American Senate, 
Salazar wrote to the President of the Republic and asked him to call an 
extraordinary session of the “Assembleia Nacional”. The seriousness of 
the occasion justified it.
On the 25th July Salazar was present in person at the Camara and made 
a speech.
He first analysed the international situation after the Second World 
War. He regretted the crushing of Germany, the limitations of the 
Western powers, and, above all, the advance and the vast room for 
manoeuvre which Russia had gained in the North, East and South of 
Europe. “In these terms -  says Salazar -  one can say that if glory was the 
lot of some, victory belongs effectively to others”58.
Secondly, he expanded the theme of the Russian threat and stated the 
need to develop a security system that would protect Western and 
Christian Civilization from the communist threat. In the ultimate aims of 
the Treaty, he felt attached to “the obligations of the Pact”59
Thirdly, he developed the subject of the consequences of the Treaty on 
the future of Portugal’s foreign relations. Relating to Britain, an old ally 
and traditional axis of Portugal's foreign policy, he stated that, due to the 
threat to the freedom and security of the Atlantic, and as England was one 
of the members, the Pact could not but reinforce the old Portuguese- 
British Alliance. As for Spain, he affirmed the total compatibility between 
the Atlantic Alliance and the Iberian Pact and reaffirmed his support to 
Spanish adhesion.
Finally, he reinforced once more the reservations already referred to, 
but concluded: “All of these are nevertheless lesser problems when faced
57 Cf the Report of the Camara Corporativa, in Diàrio das Sessóes da 
Assembleia Nacional n5 200, on the 26 July 1949, p.p. 732/735.
58 Cf. Salazar, Discursos e Notas Politicas, voi IV -  1943/1950, Coimbra, 
s/d, p.405.




























































































with this fundamental fact: a good number of European countries with 
their lives of freedom, if threatened from now on can rely upon the help 
of the United States and each counts on the others to defend their 
civilizational heritage. It seemed difficult for us to be absent in such 
circumstances”60. The final word had been said.
The Parliament met on the 27th July, to discuss and vote on the Treaty. 
Once again the Prime Minister's predictions of the treaty were praised. 
Once more, and during the debate, the reservations about the Treaty were 
emphasized: the reference to the United Nations Charter, the long 
duration of the Pact, the exclusion of Spain. Last, the destruction of 
Germany was again regretted, as her adhesion would only strengthen the 
Pact and the need to protect Westem-Christian Civilization from the 
communist threat was once more referred to.
A short piece of the Member of Parliament José Nosilini’s declaration, 
sums up the climate that dominated the Chamber and the spirit in which 
the ratification of the Treaty had been voted on: “We are all aware that 
becoming a member of the Pact is not something we really wanted -  it is 
a duty and a must”61.
The conclusions of the Parliamentary commissions of Defense and 
Foreign Affairs, reflecting the same spirit and according to the same 
arguments gave their support to the ratification of the Treaty62- The final 
result of the vote was 80 votes in favour and 3 votes against.
In the “Diârio do Govemo” of the 28th July, the resolution on the 
Treaty was published and its text ratified by the “Assembleia Nacional”. 
then Portugal became a full member of the Atlantic Alliance.
5. Conclusion:
In conclusion, what answers can we find to the different questions 
raised in the text:
What was the role played by Portugal as a founder member?
id. op. cit. p. 422.
61 Cf. Diârio das Sessôes da Assembleia Nacional, n9 201, on the 28 July 
1949, p. 743.




























































































What was the real role played by Salazar during the adhesion process?
What consequences would the adhesion to the Pact bring to domestic 
policy as well as to foreign policy in Portugal?
Portugal’s role as founder member is not really relevant. As well as the 
other invited powers. When the invitation was extended to Portugal the 
negotiations between the countries which had promoted the Pact were 
already in their final stages and the text of the Treaty had almost reached 
its final version. The reservations put forward by the Portuguese 
government were not accepted because, as we can see, none of them 
affected the great powers. Contradicting his own biographer63 who 
emphasizes Portugal’s role, Salazar himself recognized in his speech to 
the “Assembleia Nacional”: “the intervention of the Portuguese 
government in forging the Treaty -  he says -  was relatively modest64”
On Salazar’s role two distinct problems have to be considered: the first, 
and less important, is the much publicized prediction of the Treaty; the 
second, and essential, is the analysis of his political and diplomatic 
positions which means the nature of his decision.
Regarding the prevision of the Treaty, in his time supported by the 
official institutions and recently by Franco Nogueira and even José Freire 
Antunes65- one point should be made clear. The correctness of Salazar’s 
understanding of the international situation is not in question here. Both 
head of Government and of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, for many years 
and having endured particularly difficult periods such the Spanish Civil 
War and the Second World War , Salazar was perfectly aware of the 
evolution of the international scene. And since the end of the war he was 
conscious of the great changes in the correlation of forces and of the 
emergence of a new context of European security. He demonstrated this 
in his speeches of 1947 and 1948 . In the face of the Russian threat, the 
possible context of Western security, would be a system that could join 
Europe to Africa, supported by the United States66- With reference to this 
one should in the first place point out the difference between an Euro- 
African alliance (with the colonial significance which this had) with
63 cf. Franco Nogueira, op. cit. p.p. 142/146.
64 Cf, Salazar, op.cit. p.421.
66 José Freire Antunes, “Portugal e a Guerra Fria” in O Semanârio, 23 December 
1988, p.p. 14/15.
66 Cf. the Salazar’s speeches “Miséria e Medo, caracterfsticas da hora actual”, on 
the 25 November 1947, and “O Ocidente em face da Russia”, on the 28 April 1948, 




























































































America’s support, suggested by Salazar, and a Euro-American alliance 
restricted to the North Atlantic that would be the proposal of the western 
nations. Next, one should note that the general idea of the new security 
context and the actual initiative of the Brussels Pact countries and its 
American counterpart are far from being the same thing.
To Salazar, what really counted was the defense of the values of 
Western and Christian Civilisation. The Cold War and the soviet presence 
in Europe gave support to his anti-communism. It was this spirit of 
crusade that encouraged and legitimated his final decision.
As far as Salazar’s role in the process is concerned, it is important to 
note two points: firstly his own personal wishes; secondly the nature of 
his decision.
From a personal point of view, Salazar was far from enthusiastic about 
joining the Pact. In fact, he always had serious, repeated and insistent 
doubts. We can say that his decision was less an act of conviction than one 
of necessity.
As far as the nature of his decision is concerned, we must stress that it 
was subject to two strong conditions: firstly to the geo-strategic nature of 
Portugal’s territory and secondly, essencially, to the international 
situation.
The invitation extended to Portugal was a direct result of the importance 
of the Portuguese strategic triangle for the military plans of the Alliance, 
especially the Azores, in the so-called “rapid reinforcement of Europe”.
The internal divisions and, above all, the strong outside pressures 
reduced Salazar’s room for manoeuvre, limited his alternatives and 
conditioned his decision profoundly .
Considering the two systems which exist, according to Duroselle, in the 
process of decision-making in foreign policy67 -  the system of causality 
(the weight of “deep forces”) and the system of finality (the aims and 
freedom of the “statesman”). We have to conclude that in this case the 
decisive weight is that of the “deep forces” rather than of the “Statesman”. 
The system of causality seems to prevail over that of finality.
If we take Duroselle’s own classification68of decisions on foreign policy 
as a model we can classify Salazar’s as follows: it was obviously political
67 Cf. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, “La Liberté de 1’ Homme Politique”, in Léo 
Hamon, L’ Elaboration de la Politique Étrangère, Paris, 1969, 
p.p.153/160, particulary p.156




























































































in nature but it was also ideological considering its manifest anti­
communism designs and the spirit of crusade in defense of a system of 
civilization; it was of a national dimension; immediate in its urgency; and, 
above all, inevitable in the necessity of its choice.
It would have been very difficult for any other decision to have been 
taken. It was more than Salazar’s political wishes, it was a result of the 
geo-political and geo-strategic nature of the Portuguese territory and the 
unique situation created by the Cold War.
Portugal’s joining the Alliance would still constitute a great victory for 
Salazar, “malgré lui”, but still a victory.
At an internal level, Portugal’s joining the Pact had great significance 
and three consequences. Firstly it meant international recognition of the 
Lisbon government. After the difficult post-war impact, the western 
democracies themselves were thus legitimating Salazar’s regime69. 
Secondly, and the same time, it threw the opposition, both democratic and 
communist, into their greatest and longest crisis of the whole regime70- 
Finally the modernization and professional training of the armed forces 
kept the military away from political intervention for a long time.
At an external level, the signing of the Pact was no less significant. As 
far as the Iberian Peninsula was concerned, it meant that Portugal’s 
position was strengthened in relation to Spain. In general, it meant the 
permanent and privileged alliance with maritime power in the Atlantic 
which was traditional in Portuguese foreign policy. It meant, however, a 
fundamental change in its pole of reference which was the Portuguese 
answer to the international scene of the second post-war period: the 
decline of the “old alliance” and the emergence of a new axis on the other 
side of the Atlantic -  the United States of America.
It is interesting to note how the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in a press 
conference considered two important points on the joining of new members: 
“Firstly their ability to develop the democratic principles of the Pact; secondly if 
they were in a position to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area”. And in 
answer to a journalist about the category in which Portugal was included, he said: 
“he voted considering both classifications”. Cf. Telegrama n2 94, da Em 
baixada em Washington de 18 de Março de 1949, A.M.N.E., Arquivo da 
Embaixada em Washington, Pasta 150, proc. 70.
70 On this crisis it is important to see not only the recent bibliography (cf. note 54) 
but also the mémoires of their own political men. cf. Mârio Soares, Portugal 
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